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International context
The aftermath of the First World War brought a new political order to the entire Middle East, including Arabia. The Ottoman Empire's collapse ended its role in Arabian affairs while Great Britain reached the peak of its influence. For launching the Arab revolt against the Ottomans, Shariff:Iusayn of Mecca received British support to establish the Hashemite kingdom of the Hijaz. The resurgent Sa'iidi emirate led by 'Abd al-'AzTz ibn Sa'iid had wrested alAhsa' from the Ottomans in 1913 and continued expanding after the war, conquering the Rashidi emirate ofJabal Shammar in 1921 and the kingdom of the Hijaz four years later. In North Yemen, the Ottoman evacuation gave the Zaydi imamate occasion to occupy the coastal plain while Britain retained control over Aden and influence over the southern Yemeni hinterland. Little changed for Gulf coast shaykhdoms in treaty relations, with Great Britain guaranteeing their independence in exchange for conceding London dominance in foreign relations. Beyond the Ottoman sphere, Oman was divided between the coastal area under the British-influenced Al Bu SaId sultanate and a reinvigorated IbacF imamate buttressed by tribal forces in the interior.
A breach in Britain's hegemony opened in 1933, when Saudi Arabia's King 'Abd al-'Az1z granted an American consortium an oil concession, a step that led to firm political and military ties between Washington and Riyadh during the Cold War. Anti-British colonialism in Aden began to stir in the 1940s, and that sentiment spread to the Gulf in the 1950s among workers in the oil sector, urged by Arab nationalists to demand better wages and conditions as well as a voice in government. Dynastic rule held firm except in North Yemen, where army officers deposed the imam in 1962; five years later the British withdrew from South Yemen, yielding it to a Marxist revolutionary regime. In 1971 Great Britain withdrew from the Gulf: and the United States replaced it as the guarantor of dynasties facing domestic challenges and threats from Iraq and Iran. Baghdad had exited the pro-Western camp in the July 1958 revolution against its pro-Western monarchy. Iran left the Western orbit when the 1979 revolution deposed the Pahlavi monarchy.
The Shi T ingredient in Iran's Islamic republic spurred unrest among Shl'is in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, prompting their rulers to seek firm security guarantees from Washington without appearing to be subservient. The United States therefore maintained an 'over-the-horizon' presence until Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, whereupon the Al Sa'fid welcomed massive military intervention. The decision to retain a large American military presence, even one stationed in remote bases, caused a prolonged period of internal unrest in Saudi Arabia. With the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the United States reduced its presence in the Wahhabi kingdom, but the Islamic reaction to Iraq's guerrilla war makes close association with Washington a liability for Arabia's dynasties, whose resistance to participatory political institutions renders them dependent on an external great power, much as they had been at the opening of the period.
Transition to hydrocarbon economy
Prior to Arabia's passage to a hydrocarbon economy, agriculture, pastoral nomadism and caravan trade were the main sources of livelihood. In the eastern and southern coastal regions, fishermen, boat-builders and pearl divers laboured while merchants traded throughout the Indian Ocean basin. That polyglot world included an Arabian diaspora of Hadramis in the East Indies, Omanis in East Africa and Yemenis in Somalia. Enclaves of Indian, Somali and Persian merchants dominated trade in Aden, the Gulf and Oman. Two developments disrupted the Gulf regional economy and brought the half-century pearling boom to a close. First, the global Depression weakened markets and financing. Then, in the 1930s, Japanese cultured pearls drove down prices. The age of oil concessions could not have arrived at a more propitious moment: oilfields provided pearl divers with employment; merchants obtained contracts to provision oil camps; and royalty payments to rulers put their shaky polities on firm fiscal ground.
Oil wealth also enabled Gulf rulers to develop modern governments. State building began with measures to regularise capacity to collect revenue, manage a budget and bolster military and police powers. Because Ottoman administrative and educational reforms barely touched Arabia, rulers turned to expatriate Arab and British advisers for guidance on such matters, and typically delegated authority over provincial affairs and specialised departments to fellow members of the ruling lineage. After the Second World War, rising oil production made possible a more rapid and ambitious expansion of government institutions and the construction of modern transport and communications infrastructures in pursuit of the modern state's goal of achieving uniform authority through coercive means (pacifying nomadic tribes in Saudi Arabia, re-establishing the Omani sultan's control over the interior) and through co-optation (delivering the fruits of oil wealth as goods and services).
In political terms, oil disrupted a historical relationship between rulers and merchants by concentrating wealth with the former, but policies according merchants privileged access to commercial and real estate sectors reconciled them to the new order. As rulers renegotiated oil concessions to acquire a larger share of revenues, they acquired the means to gain citizens' allegiance in exchange for free education and health care, guaranteed employment and subsidised utilities. In the 1960s and 1970s petroleum sales funded a physical transformation as cities of asphalt, glass and steel mushroomed and hydrocarbon industrial complexes sprang up. Mud-walled homes were abandoned for villas and high-rises equipped with electrical power, air conditioning, piped water and plumbing. Mental landscapes altered as well, as public education systems for all citizens with uniform curricula blending modern subjects, religion and national histories replaced schooling in mosque and madrasa for the few.
Saudi Arabia
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the third incarnation of Sa'ucli-Wahhabi power. The second Sa'iidi emirate collapsed in 1891 after prolonged dynastic strife and came under the Rashidis, former vassals based in J:Ia'il. In 1902 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Sa'Iid (r. 1932-53) seized Riyadh, and during the next thirty years extended his power through war and diplomacy. He achieved this by joining to the traditional elements of Sa'iidi military power (militias raised from oasis settlements and tribal allies) the Ikhwan, former nomads residing ~n agricultural settlements and converted to Wahhabi doctrine. ' The first Ikhwan settlements were set up around 1913. They represented an effort to domesticate nomads by concentrating them at oases and instructing r John S. Habib, Ibn Saud's warriors of Islam (Leiden, 1978) . them in Wahhabi tenets, including the view that other Muslims were infidels and thus legitimate targets for jihad. The Ikhwan provided a convenient instrument for Ibn Sa'iid, particularly in his campaign to wrest the Hijaz from the Hashemites in the 1920s. Once he achieved that objective, he withdrew them from the Holy Cities to prevent confrontations with pilgrims whose religious practices the Ikhwan would find objectionable. Ibn Sa'ud then commanded them to cease attacks on 'infidel' tribes in Transjordan and Iraq to avoid conflict with Great Britain, the mandatory power in those two kingdoms. The Ikhwan refused to sacrifice religious idealism for the sake of dynastic interest. Moreover, some Ikhwan leaders were tribal nobility who viewed themselves as Ibn Sa'iid's peers, not his subjects, so they were not only disinclined to obey him, but eager to challenge him. When Ibn Sa'Iid conferred with Wahhabi 'ulamii' in 1927 and 1928 to consider the Ikhwan's grievances, the 'uiamii' endorsed his sole prerogative to wage jihad. In December 1928 a band of renegade Ikhwan attacked a caravan of Sa'jidi merchants, an action that could not be justified under any Wahhabi interpretation. That incident gave Ibn Sa'iid the pretext to launch a campaign to suppress them completely. At the battle of al-Sabila in March 1929 his forces inflicted a decisive defeat on the Ikhwan.
Ibn Sa'iid's handling of the Ikhwan signalled his quest for international legitimacy and his willingness to compromise Wahhabi principle if it might jeopardise his power. Managing the annual pilgrimage presented yet another challenge requiring a balance between satisfying Wahhabi rigour and international Muslim opinion. Anxiety over the Holy Cities was natural, given the bad reputation that trailed the Sa'iidis for acts committed when they briefly ruled the Hijaz in the early 1800s, when Wahhabi clerics ordered the razing of saints' tombs and Sa'iidi forces blocked the Ottoman pilgrimage. Ibn Sa'iid wished to dispel that reputation. He facilitated passage from Jiddah to Mecca by introducing motor transport; he regulated guides notorious for cheating pilgrims; and he improved public hygiene. Furthermore, he installed a mild regime of Wahhabi religious supervision, in part by restricting the presence of Ikhwan. Ibn Sa'fid could ill afford to alienate Muslim opinion because the pilgrim traffic brought much-needed revenue until the Depression caused numbers to fall from around roo,ooo to 25,000 pilgrims in 1932, the year Ibn Sa'iid proclaimed his domain the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The regions making up the newly formed kingdom had little in common. Najd remained a land of nomadic tribes and small oasis settlements whose merchants traded with the Hijaz, the Gulf coast, Iraq and India. The Hijaz was the site of Islam's two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, and the Red Sea merchant town ofJiddah. The religious culture in those places was alien to Wahhabi creed, more akin to the Ottoman pluralism oflegal schools and Sufi orders. In the east, al-Ahsa' possessed rich agricultural lands and was home to a large Twelver Shi T population. In the south, 'Asir had a mixed population ofWahhabis and Zaydi Sm'is. Knitting together these disparate regions into a modern nation-state would be the project of the Al Sa'iid kings for the rest of the century. The tools at their disposal included coercion, co-optation, religious indoctrination and economic development.3
During the interwar period the treasury depended on revenues from the annual influx of pilgrims, but the Depression reduced that traffic to a trickle. In 1933 Ibn Sa'ud turned to a consortium of United States companies seeking an oil concession. Aramco geologists' discovery of oil in 1938 promised relief to the treasury, but significant production awaited the end of the Second World War. Towards the end of that conflict Ibn Sa'ud and the United States augmented commercial ties with a strategic relationship as American defence planners obtained permission to construct a military airfield in Eastern Province (formerly al-Ahsa') as part of Washington's post-war network of overseas bases. Tapping the kingdom's oil reserves required a pool of skilled labour lacking in Saudi Arabia. Ibn Sa'iid ended the perennial taboo on admitting infidels to the W ahhabis' purely monotheistic domain, but he minimised interaction between expatriates and citizens by creating enclaves for the former. Soon, the Eastern Province contained scattered compounds where expatriates reproduced living conditions more characteristic of California than Riyadh. The oil sector also spawned a modern working class largely composed of non-Sa'iidi Arabs who arrived with nationalist and leftist political ideas that seeped into Sa'iidi society, causing political ferment in the 1950s and 196os.4
King 'Abd al-'Aziz died in 1953, before the logic of opening to the outside world had fully unfolded. In the following decade the kingdom witnessed a power struggle between the new king, Sa'iid (r. 1981.6 The oil boom funded construction on a vast scale, rapidly transforming cityscapes with broad boulevards lined with high-rise office buildings, commercial enterprises and hotels. Populating the burgeoning cities were waves of mostly male expatriate workers from Asia and Arab countries. New money reshaped habits of consumption and leisure as well, fostered in part by Faysal's introduction of television and girls' education. Within a few years Sa'udis undertook a double migration. In provincial towns some abandoned their small mud-brick homes for large air-conditioned villas equipped with modem amenities. Others relocated from the provinces to major cities such as Riyadh, Jiddah and Dhahran. Nomads abandoned their tents for jobs as taxi and truck drivers, oilfield workers and security forces. The shrinking population of nomads remaining in the desert embraced motor vehicles, shifted from camels to sheep and goats, and came to rely on water tanks dispersed in the desert. Modern government had advantages: improved health care, more reliable food supplies and security with the suppression of tribal feuds and caravan raids. On the other hand, all this required sacrificing nomads' customary self-sufficiency. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 brought to the surface tensions between leading clerics and younger religious personalities, known as shaykhs of the awakening (Sahwa), influenced by Muslim Brother ideas. King Fahd's decision to invite United States military forces to defend against a possible Iraqi invasion rested on a fatwii from the Wahhabi establishment, but it provoked harsh criticism from Sahwa shaykhs on the grounds that Islamic law prohibits seeking assistance from infidels." At the same time, Sa'Iidi liberals petitioned the king to move in the direction of a representative constitutional monarchy with protections for religious groups such as the Shi Ts and curbs on Wahhabi authority over public behaviour. Religious conservatives responded with their own set of petitions calling for greater compliance with Islamic law in foreign and domestic policy. The petitions revealed the lines of Saudi Arabia's Kulturkampf and expressed a common desire for accountability of rulers to citizens and curbing corruption. King Fahd responded with a crackdown and the promulgation of a Basic Law (1992), which provided for the formation of a consultative council (majlis 14 Dissent then assumed more violent form. In November 1995 militants exploded a car bomb outside the National Guard building in Riyadh, and in June 1996, they set off a powerful explosion in the Eastern Province city Khobar. The attacks targeted the Al Sa'ud's alliance with the United States.
Osama Bin Laden and al-Qa'ida gave ideological focus to such attacks with pronouncements calling on Muslims to rise up against the Americans, dubbed 'Crusaders' in their discourse. Bin Laden had participated in the Afghan jihad on the same side as the Sa 'iidi government and the United States, and when Iraq invaded Kuwait, he had offered the Al Sa'iid his services if they would agree to dispense with American military backing. But like the Sahwa shaykhs he turned against the rulers for despoiling Arabia by hosting infidel military forces. In August 1998 al-Qa'ida pursued the anti-American jihad with twin suicide truck bombings against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Its agents attacked an American naval vessel at Aden in October 2000. Then, on II September 2001, al-Qa'ida struck the United States by crashing hijacked commercial airliners into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and a field in western Pennsylvania." At first, Sa'udis doubted that Bin Laden and al-Qa'ida were responsible for the attacks. Only when al-Qa'ida attacked a residential compound in Riyadh in May 2003 did Sa'udis become convinced that the organisation was indeed responsible for II September. Sa'iidi cities then became the scene of fire fights between security forces and al-Qa'ida militants.
The Al Sa'iid faced calls from home and abroad for measures to curb religious extremism and to advance political reform. A series of officially sponsored National Dialogues broached taboos such as the standing of non-Wahhabi Muslims (Shi Ts and Sufis), religious education and women's status." Elections to municipal councils and chambers of commerce were held. At the same time, there was no indication that King 'Abd Allah (r. 2005-) would take steps that might diminish the Al Sa'iid's firm grip on power. While the Burayrni dispute moved to arbitration, Sultan Sa'Td was waging diplomacy to persuade inner Oman's shaykhs to give him their allegiance upon Imam Muhammad' s death, which occurred in May 1954. Tribal notables and 'ulamii' convened to elect a new imam, Ghalib ibn 'Ali al-Hina'I. His decision to seek Sa'iidi assistance weakened his standing, and in June 1955 a number of Burayrni shaykhs declared allegiance to the sultan. Shortly afterwards, Britain dispatched troops to oust the Sa'iidis from Buraym1 in October 1955. In the next two months the sultan's forces overran the main interior towns and Imam Chalib abdicated, but his brother Talib and other backers of the imarnate's independence took refuge in Saudi Arabia. Sultan Said then undertook a tour of inner Oman to mark its reintegration into the sultanate, promising to retain the imamates officials in their positions and to refrain from punishing Imam Chalib's former supporters.20 Saudi Arabia maintained its claim to Buraymi and assisted the deposed imam's brother, Talib ibn 'Al1, to mount a revolt for the imamate's restoration. He returned to Oman in June 1957 leading the Oman Revolutionary Movement to rally tribal allies and opponents of British influence. London's decision to intervene with air power reversed the course of battle and compelled Talib' s forces to retreat to the heights of Jabal Akhdar, where they held out until early 1959. The Oman Revolutionary Movement survived for three years, but by 1962 the imamate was extinct, the sultan's authority restored to the interior and the Sa'fidi challenge in Burayrni defeated. One effect of the conflict was the establishment, with British support, of Oman's first modern military force, the Sultan's Armed Forces.
In 1958 Sultan Sa'Id moved to the Dhufar port city ofSalala, where he had begun residing more frequently since the late 1930s. His high-handed conduct in the province incited a general uprising in 1965. The Dhufar rebellion had both tribal and ideological Marxist strands, the latter attracting strong support from the Soviet Bloc, including South Yemen, while Britain, Iran and Jordan backed the sultan. The region's small, dispersed population (roughly 60,000 in 1970) included a large non-Arab segment, locally calledjibaus, who had not come under central authority before. Hence, the rebellion expressed rejection of political integration by an autonomous region. In 1965 local tribal groupings joined forces in the Dhufar Liberation Front (DLF). The rebellion assumed a radical flavour and more ambitious goals in 1968 when the DLF assumed a new name, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf Within two years it dominated the Dhiifar mountains and a coastal town. Success spurred the formation of the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf in tribal areas of the former imamate. While the sultan's forces easily suppressed it, its appearance prompted Sa'Id's son Qabus (r. 1970-) to seize power."
The son of a Dhufari mother, Sultan Qabus ibn Said had been educated in England and resided in Salala. As the rebellion gained momentum he plotted with relatives, army officers, tribal leaders and British officials to depose his father. He made his move on 23 July 1970, launching an armed assault on the palace to compel SaId to abdicate, who then went into exile in England. To quell the rebellion Sultan Qabiis used military and political measures, pledging to improve the region's medical, education and water facilities, and offering amnesty to rebels. He also used oil revenues to expand the armed forces and obtained reinforcements from Britain, Iran and Jordan. The combination of political inducements and robust military measures resulted in the rebellion's collapse by the end of 1975.
Qabiis took steps to demonstrate his determination to move Oman in new directions. He dismissed his father's officials, installed a new cabinet and returned the sultanate's seat to Muscat. Under Sultan Sa'Td only Britain and India had maintained permanent envoys in Oman; Qabiis established ties with Arab countries, bringing his country into the Arab League and reconciling differences with Saudi Arabia. He departed from his father's conservative policies by investing in the modernisation of infrastructure and social institutions. Construction of ports, an international airport and roads accompanied projects to lay down an electricity grid and provide clean water, health facilities and schools." Expatriates and Omanis returning from Bahrain, Kuwait and Zanzibar executed these projects.
Sultan Qabiis also developed new political institutions that spread responsibility for decisions on social and economic policies. In 1981 he created the State Consultative Council, consisting of appointed members from each of the country's districts. Nine years later he dissolved that body and replaced it with the Omani Consultative Council. Candidates for the new body were chosen through indirect election and then final selection by the sultan. Women gained the right to vote and run for the council in 1997. The year before, the sultan issued a Basic Law, which serves as a constitutional document. 23 If measured by the criterion of political stability, Oman's gradual pace of economic, social and political development has succeeded. Dhurar is firmly integrated and a popular destination for Gulf Arab tourists. The imamate's former domain is likewise calm. The Islamist wave that washed over much of Arabia barely touched Oman. In 1994 the authorities arrested as many as 200 Islamists allegedly linked to the Muslim Brothers for plotting to sow unrest; they were released from prison the following year as part of a general amnesty for political prisoners.24 In 2005 rumours spread of an Islamist conspiracy to attack a popular cultural gathering, the Muscat Festival, but it turned out to be a small group of Ibad'i traditionalists quixotically seeking to re-establish the imamate. As in the 1994 The export of oil, begun in 1949, made possible a first phase of administrative development, under British tutelage, with the creation of fiscal and police institutions. The oil industry also stimulated political change. In 1951 Qatari workers protested at the employment of Dhufaris and successfully pressed for their expulsion. Labour unrest and Arab nationalist agitation broke out in 1956, and again in 1963. In response, the rulers established hiring preferences for Qataris and protected Qatari merchants by requiring that businesses have majority ownership for nationals." At independence in September 1971, Shaykh Ahmad issued a temporary constitution and created municipal councils offering merchants a share in local governance. Shaykh Khalifa was the first ruler to curtail allowances to the Al Thani, electing to court the backing of ordinary Qataris with higher spending for education, health and housing. At the same time, the Al Than1 continued to dominate cabinet positions and powerful institutions (armed forces, police, treasury). The rise in oil prices made it possible to embark on massive construction of infrastructure. Given Qatar's tiny population and late start at educating its citizens, the tasks of staffing schools, health clinics and technical positions required the hiring of expatriate workers, who comprised So per cent of the population by the early 1980s. Hamad ibn Khalifa followed his 1995 coup against his father with promises to bring significant changes to Qatar's political order. To buttress his declared commitment to liberal policies, he dissolved the Ministry of Information, ending official censorship. In 1996 he launched al-jazira satellite television network. The network's candid treatment of taboo social and political matters (excepting Qatari affairs) gained it a wide Arab audience, inspired imitators and fostered a more open climate for public discourse. In 1998 Qatar held elections to the Chamber of Commerce (heretofore an appointive body). In municipal council elections the following year, women were eligible to vote and run for office. These moves in a liberal direction have been tempered by Amir Hamad's retention of complete control over revenues and budget. 39 In the Trucial states early twentieth-century politics consisted of power struggles within ruling lineages and between neighbouring shaykhdoms. Dubai's commercial ties throughout the Indian Ocean basin made it the most cosmopolitan town of the lower Gulf, its merchants serving as the channel for modern cultural influences emanating from Cairo and Bombay. As the economy shifted in the mid-1930s from pearling to oil concessions and air-base royalties, Dubai's merchants followed the example of their counterparts in Kuwait. In 1938 they pressed Shaykh Sa'Id ibn Maktiim (r. 1912-58) to limit his share of oil royalties and to establish a majlis to supervise the treasury and institute reforms in education and municipal administration. In March 1939 Shaykh Sa'Td dissolved the majlis and replaced it with an appointed advisory Merchants Council.
In neighbouring Abu Dhabi, dynastic rivalries plagued the Al Nahavan until Shaykh Shakhbiit ibn Sultan (r. 1928-66) gained control. He signed an oil concession in 1935, but the extent of the concession was unclear because of rival territorial claims asserted by Abu Dhabi, Oman and Saudi Arabia. In the mid-rosos Britain supported Abu Dhabi's claim to several villages in the Burayrni oasis. Following the discovery of oil in 1958, revenues began to grow, but Shaykh Shakhbiit, a cautious autocrat in the mould of Oman's Sultan Sa'Id, refused to spend on projects like those in Kuwait and Bahrain. In During the 1960s Britain encouraged the Trucial states to cooperate on security, oil exploration and public works. Modest steps in these areas paved the way for the more ambitious enterprise of forming an independent federation once Britain decided to withdraw from the Gulf. Abu Dhabi's Shaykh Zayid emerged as the leading voice for a federation to encompass the Trucial states, Bahrain and Qatar. Dubai's Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'Td (r. 1958-90) made adherence to the federation conditional on autonomy for each shaykhdom. Ra's al-Khayrna's shaykh baulked at joining as he hoped that an oil discovery would spare him the need to depend on Abu Dhabi's benevolence; Iran's occupation of two disputed islands prompted him to join.:" In the end, Bahrain and Qatar opted for independence, and in December 1971 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) emerged as a federation of the former Trucial states: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ra's al-Khayrna, Fujayrah, 'Ajman and Umm al-Qaywayn. Shaykh Zayid became president and Shaykh Rashid the vice-president. The seven shaykhs comprise the Supreme Council of Rulers, a body that sets policy for an appointed Council of Ministers, mostly drawn from shaykhly lineages. A forty-seat appointed Federal National Council possesses consultative, not legislative, powers. Abu Dhabi and Dubai dominate these bodies because of their wealth, not their population; in fact, Sharjah and Ra's al-Khayma each have more Emirati nationals than the two dominant emirates. In general, Abu Dhabi has pushed for increased centralisation while Dubai has sought to retain the autonomy of each emirate. This has made it difficult to formulate common policies on immigration and sharing revenues as well as unification of defence forces.41
The UAE has followed the Kuwaiti model of spending oil revenues to develop infrastructure and provide its citizens free education, medical care and subsidised housing. Pursuing these projects required heavy dependence on expatriate labour from Arab countries, Asia and the West. By the 1990s Emirati nationals counted for only 15 per cent of the population. While Abu Dhabi is the centre of the federal government and the purse for poorer shaykhdoms, Dubai's Al Maktiim have developed a diverse range of commercial and financial enterprises to wean their emirate from dependence on oil. By the late 1990s petroleum products accounted for only IO 
Yemen
Yemen stands apart from the rest of Arabia in several respects. It possesses the most extensive and productive agricultural lands in the peninsula, allowing for relatively dense settlement of Arabia's second most populous country. While other monarchies survived domestic and regional crises, Yemenis have lived under republics since the 1960s. Its recently discovered petroleum reserves are modest by Arabian standards and, unlike the oil-rich states, it has long been an exporter rather than a receiver of expatriate workers. With few natural resources, Yemen depended on foreign aid to finance modern infrastructure, and regimes lacked the means to gain citizens' allegiance with social benefits. South Yemen's Marxist regime pursued revolutionary transformation while North Yemen's military-dominated republics struggled to attain stability and genuine authority over its population.
In 1904 Yemen was divided between the Zaydi imamate in the north and a British sphere in the south comprising a colony in Aden and autonomous chieftaincies. Revolutionary army officers overthrew the imarnate in 1962, triggering an eight-year civil war against royalist forces. In Aden and the Protectorates, an anti-colonial movement fought for independence, achieved in 1967. During the 1970s and 1980s coexistence between the two Yemens was uneasy because the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) had a conservative complexion and capitalist economy while the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was Marxist. In 1990 they merged to form the Republic of Yemen, but the stresses of unification resulted in war in 1994, when northern military forces thwarted former PDRY leaders seeking secession. Throughout the century Yemen underwent a state-building project as rulers strove to project power over populations that had seldom felt the reach of central authority. In the early twenty-first century the project remained incomplete.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire left the field clear for Imam Yahya (r. 1904-48) to embark on an enterprise similar to 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'iid's expansion and consolidation of power. Yahya expelled the Idrisi ruler of 'Asir from southern Tihama and waged a harsh campaign to pacify that region's powerful tribesmen. When he attempted to extend his authority into the British sphere of influence, his forces retreated in the face of aerial attacks. By the 1934 Treaty of San'a', Yahya acknowledged the 1904 Anglo-Ottoman boundary agreement between North and South Yemen. Also in 1934, his bid to annex 'Asir and Najran precipitated war with Saudi Arabia. Yemeni forces were no match for the northern neighbour, and Yahya conceded Najran and 'Asir to the Sa'udis by the Treaty ofTa'if.
Yahya aspired to cement authority over a population dispersed among hundreds of small settlements scattered over rugged terrain. While the imam enjoyed legitimacy among Zaydi tribes in his domain's northern parts, lower Yemen's Shafi'T townsmen and villagers were less inclined to accord him their allegiance. He relied on Ottoman-trained advisers for expertise in foreign relations and concentrated power in his immediate family by appointing his sons to govern the main towns. To augment the ranks of capable administrators, Yahya sent a few dozen Yemenis to study in Lebanon and Cairo. To strengthen military capacity, he sent a mission to Baghdad and engaged Iraqi military trainers in San'a'. Young Yemenis exposed to more advanced conditions in other countries formed a critical component of political opposition to the imamate, and quite a few found their way to Aden.42
In striving to gather more power, Yahya departed from Zaydi custom by acting in the manner of a king rather than an imam." Thus, he rankled traditionalists in 1927 Movement, 1935 Movement, -1962 (Beirut, 1987) External forces complicated Yemen's civil war. Nasser dispatched Egyptian troops to bolster republican forces while royalists drew support from Saudi Arabia. Nasser also sent civilian advisers to direct government offices in San'a', but their overbearing manner made the Sallal regime unpopular and exacerbated political differences on the republican side between hardliners and moderates. The royalist side was divided between proponents of full restoration and advocates of an imamate committed to modernisation. Despite meagre resources and political turmoil, the revolutionary regime took steps to transform society. It nationalised the oil refinery, large industries and foreign firms, causing northern merchants who had come to Aden for the opportunities afforded by the colonial economy to return home. An agrarian reform law put a ceiling on landholdings and the authorities converted confiscated estates to cooperatives and state farms. Measures to advance the welfare of ordinary citizens included efforts on behalf of nomads such as digging wells and placing water tanks at frequent intervals, subsidising housing for poor citizens and steps to bring about equality between men and women. The Family Law of 1974 raised the minimum marriage age for girls to sixteen, put a ceiling on bride price, restricted polygamy and bolstered women's rights in divorce and custody cases. The government also opened higher education to female students and encouraged higher participation by women in paid occupations, but conservative attitudes in smaller towns, where most of the population lived, kept many girls out of school after a few years of elementary education. "
Relations between Yemen's two regimes were generally hostile, as Aden backed the National Democratic Front's rebellion against San'a' while the North supported remnants of FLOSY and the South Arabian League. In border clashes in February 1979, PDRY forces occupied towns inside the YAR and put them under NDF control. After mediation by Arab states, Prime Minister 'Ali Nasir Muhammad adopted a moderate line, with an eye on improving relations with Saudi Arabia, and he jettisoned the NDF. There followed a showdown between 'Ali Nasir and the ideological purist 'Abd al-Fartah Isma'Tl, who was forced to resign and go into exile. 'Ali Nasir relaxed state control over the economy to the dismay of the YSP's true believers. As strains within the regime mounted, the socialist faction brought Isma'f l back from Moscow in 1984. Finally, on 13 January 1986, 'Ali Nasir triggered a bloody climax when he attempted to kill Isma'Tl and other rivals at a YSP conference, but 'Ali Nasir was defeated and forced to flee to San'a' along with thousands of followers. Thousands perished in the fighting. The YSP had essentially decapitated itself, with dozens of leaders killed, imprisoned or exiled. Moreover, the blood-letting did not resolve fundamental economic and political problems confronting the PDRY's new president, 'Ali Salim al-Bid.51
In the early years, socialist policies had provided affordable food, broad access to education and a general feeling of equality, but by the mid-198os the country was stalled. Leaders hoped to discover valuable oil reserves, but the area of exploration in Shabwa Province near the border with the YAR meant 50 decided to meet. They agreed to connect electricity grids and facilitate border crossings in preparation for reaching a union accord, a goal frequently declared in the past, but never before seriously entertained. Pressure on Aden, however, was growing as the Soviet Union declared that it would cut support for client states. In November 1989 ?aliq. and al-Bid announced that the two regimes would achieve unification within one year under a transitional government that would hold first a referendum on a new constitution and then national parliamentary elections.52 Shortly after Yemen's unification, it became embroiled in the regional crisis sparked by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Yemen withheld support for the international coalition against Iraq. Saudi Arabia retaliated by cancelling its policy of allowing Yemenis to reside without permits, causing an enormous flood of returning migrants. As many as 800,000 workers came home in six months. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states also cut financial aid. The upshot was a period of economic hardship (inflation, unemployment, arrears in payments to government workers).53 Most Yemenis, though, supported government foreign policy and looked forward to the next steps to cementing the union. Given the disparity in population -the north had eleven million, the south had around two and a half million -President ?aliq.' s GPC seemed bound to dominate while the YSP tried to maintain influence in the south. The novel political force was the Yemeni Reform Grouping, or Isiah, a nominally Islamist party, established in 1990. Islah's leader, 'Abd Allah al-Ahmar, is a veteran of YAR politics long associated with the moderate republicans. In the April 1993 national elections the GPC rook 123 seats, followed by Islah with 62, and the YSP with 56. The YSP leadership reacted to defeat by returning to Aden and boycotting the newly elected government. Tensions between rival military units loyal to the YSP and GPC flared into warfare in May 1994. In early July northern forces overran the south, subjecting Aden to extensive looting, forcing al-Bi9 into exile and consolidating Salih's hold on power over the entire country.54
In the war's aftermath, the regime strengthened presidential powers at the expense of civil liberties enjoyed by political parties and newspaper publishers during unified Yemen's first years. Salih did not dissolve the YSP because he viewed it as a useful foil to balance Islah, which reflects both the regional upsurge oflslamists and Yemen's own complicated social and political complexion, as it contains tribal leaders and supporters of the Muslim Brothers.55 Moreover, Islah is just one part of a broad spectrum of religious activism along with Zaydi nee-traditionalists, Sa'udi-influenced Salafis, Sufis and jihadist Salafis. The pluralist landscape reflects historical religious cultures, contemporary influences from the Gulf and participation in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s. The militant strain ofjihadist Salafism is embodied by the Islamic Jihad movement and the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, small but dangerous groups. They have carried out attacks on Western targets, kidnapped tourists and assassinated a YSP leader. In the broad Yemeni context, however, they are overshadowed by the regime's capacity for co-opting dissidents and by the country's own diverse regional, social and religious composition.
Expatriate workers
Migrant workers and expatriate traders were mainstays in the Gulf well before the discovery of oil. Indian and Persian merchants dominated longdistance trade in Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the Trucial states. During the pearling season, from July to October, thousands of men flocked to the Gulf coast from Oman, Najd and southern Iraq." In its early phase the oil industry built on extant migration patterns. The Bahrain Petroleum Company, for instance, initially employed Iranians and later brought workers from India.57 Typically, expatriates first worked in the oil sector, then, as revenues increased, they carried out construction projects and staffed medical and education sectors. In each country there was seldom any question of delaying projects until the national labour force possessed the requisite technical skills to implement them. Instead, there evolved a division between the public sector, dominated by nationals, and the private sector, dominated by expatriates. The composition of the expatriate labour force has been diverse and dynamic. One tendency was for Arabs to comprise the bulk of foreign workers during the 1950s and 1960s and then for Asian workers to become predominant. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, Arabs went from nearly threequarters of expatriate workers in the early 1970s to less than one-third by the late 1990s. Because of Yemen's position on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Sa'udis expelled Yemenis. Likewise, the Kuwaitis deported Palestinians after the expulsion of Iraqi forces." A second tendency was the steady increase in the proportion of expatriate workers in the labour market until the mid-rcoos when it peaked in Gulf Cooperation Council countries at nearly threequarters of workers. By then expatriates comprised over 80 per cent of the labour force in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. A third tendency is for nationalities to specialise in occupations: Egyptians and Palestinians as teachers, Indians and Pakistanis as engineers, Sri Lankans and Filipinos as domestic servants.59
Even though expatriates are excluded from the privileges of citizenship, workers borrow money to pay for travel, work permits and visas because of the opportunity to earn much higher wages than in their home countries. Some expatriates live in segregated camps to work on short-term construction projects; others employed by smaller firms reside with countrymen, frequently relatives or fellow villagers, often in squalid conditions. Mutual aid associations based on ethnic solidarity provide emergency assistance and social support. Professionals and business managers naturally enjoy more comfortable circumstances, but no matter how long they stay, they may not own property or a business."
Eventually, population growth and declining oil reserves will diminish the ability of Gulf countries to afford a large expatriate labour force, guaranteed employment for citizens in the public sector and extensive welfare benefits. Programmes to increase citizens' participation in the private sector include technical training and quotas on expatriates. Business owners, however, have not rushed to hire citizens because they demand higher wages. Employers' complaints about their compatriots' slack work ethic might merely indicate resistance to exploitation, but they could augur profound problems ahead. 
I
Precisely when demographic pressures impinge on oil revenues will vary, with Bahrain already feeling the pinch. Political stability rests on a bargain struck in the early decades of the petroleum production. It appears that rulers will either find ways to engage citizens in productive endeavours or have to renegotiate the political bargain if they are to avoid acute political difficulties in the future.
